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1Conceptualising Cyber 
Arms Races
Abstract: This paper investigates the emergence of an arms race dynamic in the international 
cyber domain. The numerous claims made of an ongoing cyber arms race by the media and 
other analysts have not been backed up by careful empirical analysis. Characterised by the 
competitive and rapid mutual build-up of capabilities between pairs of states, arms races are 
a long standing aspect of study in international relations, with statistical evidence suggesting 
a relationship between these factors and war. Our work extends the tradition of arms race 
scholarship to the field of cyber security by providing a methodology for accounting for the 
build-up of cyber capabilities by nation states. We examine the concept of the cyber arms race 
and provide a plausibility probe for a macro study by examining the cases of the United States 
and Iran, and of North Korea and South Korea. We employ time series data on a number of 
indicators to measure each state’s scale of increase in cyber capabilities, before investigating 
whether the states in question are directing their efforts against one another. Our findings 
suggest that these state dyads have indeed been engaged in cyber arms races, as defined by their 
competitive and above-normal mutual increase in cyber capabilities. This work furthers our 
understanding of state behaviour in the cyber domain, and our methodology helps to establish a 
pathway for the future extensive data collection of this new phenomenon.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace is now considered the fifth domain of warfare after land, sea, air, and space. Cyber 
conflict can be defined as ‘the use of computational technologies in cyberspace for malevolent 
and/or destructive purposes in order to impact, change, or modify diplomatic and military 
interactions between entities’ (Valeriano and Maness, 2015, p.32). It consistently tops national 
threat assessments by policy figures, and in 2012 the US Defence Secretary warned of a ‘cyber 
Pearl Harbor’ that could devastate the country’s critical infrastructure (Bumiller and Shanker, 
2012). Regardless of the accuracy of these statements, there is a growing understanding that 
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2such insecurities are driving countries to channel ever increasing resources into their ability to 
defend themselves against cyber actions, and to launch offensive operations.
Media reports frequently use the term ‘arms race’ to describe the global proliferation of cyber 
warfare capabilities as states respond to their security concerns (Corera, 2015). For 57% of 
security experts and policy elites, the cyber arms race is a reality according to a 2012 survey 
(McAfee, 2012). Arms races traditionally refer to the rapid threat-driven and competitive 
build-up of military power between two countries, and have been criticised in the study of 
international relations due to their escalatory potential in bringing countries closer to the brink 
of war. Yet until now, the idea of a cyber arms race has not been subjected to proper empirical 
and academic analysis. 
Here we conceptualise cyber arms races by applying traditional arms race theory to the cyber 
domain, thus gaining important insights into one of the most pressing and rapidly developing 
issues in world politics. First, the arms race and cyber literature is consulted before setting 
out our methods, and then two case studies of international rival state pairs are presented: the 
United States and Iran, and North and South Korea. We first measure their scale of arming, 
and judge whether it represents abnormal rates of increase. Then we investigate the extent to 
which these build-ups in cyber power occur in competition with one another specifically. We 
conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for interstate cyber relations, as well as 
their limitations, and explain how our research paves the way for future quantitative research 
on cyber capabilities. 
2. WHAT IS AN ARMS RACE?
Arms races have been the subject of much research in the field of international relations as 
scholars have attempted to investigate their causes and consequences. In its traditional 
conceptualisation, an arms race results from mutual insecurity and the need to defend against 
an external threat. The build-up of arms is a core principle in realist theory, which tells us 
that the anarchical and self-help nature of the international system creates powerful incentives 
for countries to seek security through military strength and deter potential aggressors in an 
environment where they can never trust others’ intentions.
Rather than promote stability, however, military build-ups can give rise to a security dilemma 
whereby ‘many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security 
of others’ (Jervis, 1978). Security-seeking actions are often perceived as threatening and met 
with reactions in kind, causing interstate tensions to spiral out of control. Decades of peace 
science research has shown that arms races are associated with an increased likelihood of 
conflict, whereas very little evidence has been found in support of the opposing deterrence and 
balance of power theories (Leeds and Morgan, 2012, p.144). 
Richardson (1960) made one of the first attempts at mathematically modelling this action-
reaction dynamic, and in his set of equations each state’s rate of arming increases in response to 
increases in its rival’s military spending. This understanding of the arms race is one of mutual 
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seeks to deter a power-seeking revisionist actor whose motivations are not those of insecurity.
Psychology plays an important role in the arms racing process as policy makers do not always 
act rationally or with complete information (Jervis, 1976). Rather than react to actual threats, 
the decision to arm is often based on the ‘subjective interpretations of the actions of others’ 
(Hammond, 1993, p.47). The response to threats is therefore as much about perceptions as it is 
about reality.
A distinction can also be made between the types of capabilities involved. Qualitative arms 
races refer to the competition over technological advances in weaponry, whereas a quantitative 
arms race is the competition over the sheer number of military forces (Huntington, 1958). 
When measuring arms races using military expenditures it is important to note that a qualitative 
improvement in military capability will not necessarily be reflected in a state’s military 
expenditure levels since new and improved weapons systems may be procured less cost 
(Valeriano, Sample, and Kang, 2013). 
Gray (1971, p.40) provides a useful definition of the arms race as:
 ‘two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, 
who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring 
their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and 
anticipated military and political behaviour of the other parties’.
It seems that any form of ‘race’ in military capabilities should fundamentally feature abnormally 
high rates of arming by at least two states which are engaged in this behaviour with reference to, 
and in competition with, one another. 
Identifying such a process requires a distinction be made between normal and abnormal rates 
of military increase. One method used frequently in large-N studies (Sample, 1997; Gibler 
et al., 2005) codes a rapid build-up if a state’s annual growth in either military expenditure 
or personnel reaches 8% in each of three consecutive years. An alternative measure by Horn 
(1987) posits that a state is engaged in a rapid military build-up in a given year if its average 
growth rate in expenditure in the preceding five years is greater than that of the preceding ten 
years; and if this ten year average is greater than that of the entire time period under observation. 
Overall, the current lack of data in this relatively new and often secretive domain means that 
alternative methods for evaluating the magnitude of cyber build-ups will need to be used.
In these quantitative studies, the competitive aspect is also measured in various ways. Sample 
(1997) uses data on militarised interstate disputes (the threat, display, or use of force) to confirm 
an adversarial relationship. Gibler et al. (2005) code their arms races based on Thompson’s 
(2001) dataset of ongoing rivalries. In qualitative studies such as this, however, a more in depth 
analysis of the dyadic relationship can help uncover an action-reaction dynamic.
43. THE CYBER DOMAIN
Cyberspace is defined by Nye (2011, p.19) as the ‘Internet of networked computers but also 
intranets, cellular technologies, fibre optic cables, and space based communications’. Cyberspace 
refers to not only ‘all of the computer networks in the world’ but also to ‘everything they 
connect and control’ (Clarke and Knake 2010, p.70), highlighting the potential risk to a nation’s 
infrastructure given the fact that these systems are often dependent on Internet networks. 
According to Choucri (2010, p.228), the development of cyberspace has put states in an 
‘unprecedented situation’ characterised by high levels of uncertainty as they try to maintain 
control in the face of a changing global security environment. Proponents of the ‘cyber-
revolution’ hypothesis highlight the serious damage cyber conflict could inflict potentially, 
and in doing so elevate the threat to the top of the state’s national security concerns (Clarke 
and Knake, 2010; Kello, 2013). Others argue to the contrary that the threat is inflated and 
disconnected from reality (Lindsay, 2013; Valeriano and Maness, 2015), and as we know 
from traditional arms racing, fear and perceptions can be just as powerful drivers of security 
competition as actual threats. 
Several characteristics help to establish the perception of cyberspace as an inherently insecure 
environment. Cyber weapons are essentially ‘computer codes’ used to inflict harm (Rid and 
McBurney, 2012, p.6), meaning that unlike the physical warfare domain, the virtual nature 
of malware makes it very difficult for states to gain an accurate picture of one another’s 
capabilities. The anonymity that cyber methods can provide the attacker and the resulting 
attribution problem add to this uncertainty. Cyber capabilities include the malicious code 
created as well as the units mobilised, and the hardware and software developed, to defend 
against such code. Since cyber technologies can be much cheaper than conventional weapons, 
weaker states can possibly gain asymmetric advantages by entering into the cyber arms arena 
and compete on a more even footing with traditionally powerful states. The sources of threat 
are therefore potentially more widespread.
The belief that the cyber conflict domain favours the offense also creates insecurity. The offense-
defence balance theory postulates that if offensive military capabilities hold advantages over 
defensive capabilities, the security dilemma is more intense and the risk of arms races and war 
greater (Glaser and Kaufmann, 1998, p.47). Offensive cyber capabilities are assumed to be more 
cost effective and efficient, whereas defence is difficult given the immense challenge involved 
in securing every civilian and privately owned network and closing every vulnerability, many 
of which go undetected until an attack has pointed them out (Liff, 2012). The Internet’s lack of 
geographical constraints further undermines the utility of defence. Offensive preparations may 
therefore become the dominant strategy, which can risk setting off the security dilemma. 
Given the complexity of the cyber domain and its overall novelty, many make statements about 
the dynamics of cyber conflict without clear connections to more than a few cases, which may be 
outliers. This is why a macro and empirical perspective on cyber arms build-ups is an important 
task in the field. Exploring the concept of the cyber arms race is a theoretically appropriate 
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domain, and will help shed light on how states are reacting to their cyber security concerns.
4. METHODOLOGY
Since cyber arms races are as yet an untested phenomenon, this study can be regarded as a 
‘plausibility probe’ (Eckstein, 1975) to help decide whether the concept shows promise in 
application. We conduct case study analyses of two rival state dyads; the United States and 
Iran, and North and South Korea. These four countries are among the major players in the cyber 
conflict arena, and are therefore of great interest to policy makers and academics alike. 
The ‘structured and focused’ case study design (George and Bennett, 2005) is adopted here to 
identify the presence of cyber arms racing behaviour. This approach structures the analysis by 
asking similar questions of each case, and focuses on the key aspects of the dyadic relationship 
that will engage the research question. The two questions asked ensure the essential arms race 
criteria are met: 
1. Are both states engaged in a rapid build-up of cyber capabilities?
2. Are the states in competition with one another?
To answer the first question, time series data is presented to track changes in each state’s 
cyber capabilities. Clearly it is not possible to quantify the actual cyber ‘arms’ or malware 
possessed by states, and we acknowledge this limitation. Instead, our approach is inspired by 
the Correlates of War Project (Singer, 1972) in its use of military expenditure and personnel 
data, which have often been used in previous arms race studies. Applying this to cyberspace, 
the data that is mainly sought here is government spending on cyber security and the number 
of cyber security specialists employed by governments. These should offer a direct indication 
of the effort that states are putting into developing their overall cyber strength. Other indicators 
are relied on if this data is not available. What we aim to indicate is at least whether a significant 
increase in the effort by states to boost their capabilities is occurring. To determine whether 
these cyber build-ups are out of line of normal state behaviour, various comparison techniques 
are used to place them in context. 
To answer the second question, a qualitative approach is taken to identify a potential action-
reaction and competitive dynamic between our state pairs. We look for a general indication 
that each state is developing its capabilities in response to the actions of, or the perceived 
threat posed by, the other. If these criteria are met, it would suggest that there is an arms racing 
dynamic in cyberspace. While the security portfolio of a state is quite diverse and a major power 
like the United States likely engages multiple threats, a cyber arms race as we conceptualise it is 
indicated by the existence of an adversarial relationship and does not demand that all monetary 
amounts be directed specifically towards the opposition state under examination. The methods 
we undertake here will allude to the opportunities and challenges in measuring cyber arms 
races, and our potential limitations are discussed in more depth in the concluding section.
65. THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN
A. US Cyber Build-up
As a democratic and open society, the United States is relatively forthcoming about its 
investments in cyber security. The availability of data on two government departments, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DOD), allows a 
rough distinction to be made between the changing defensive and offensive cyber capabilities 
of the United States. 
The DHS is tasked with defending the country against a range of threats, and one of its five 
stated missions is to ‘safeguard and secure cyberspace’ by seeking to ‘analyse and reduce cyber 
threats and vulnerabilities […and to…] distribute threat warnings […and…] coordinate the 
response to cyber incidents to ensure that computers, networks, and cyber systems remain safe’ 
(DHS, 2015). Budget figures are available for the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), 
which operates under the Directorate for National Protection and Programs and is home to the 
United States’ Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) team.
Figure 1 illustrates the changing NCSD budget in constant (2014) US Dollars. Although the 
unit was formed in 2003, the data is only available between 2009 and 2014. 
FIGURE 1: NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY DIVISION BUDGET,
2009-2014 (CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE)
 
The government funding received by the Cyber Division increased from $346.5 million in 2009 
to $810 million in 2014, representing a growth of 134%. The budget has grown in almost every 
year, with a particularly large jump in 2013. To put these increases in context and determine if 
it represents an abnormal increase, Figure 2 compares the annual growth in the NCSD budget 
to that of the DHS as a whole. 
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2010-2014 (CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE)
 
On average, the budget of the NCSD grew at higher rates than its parent organisation. The 
biggest difference came in 2013 when, despite an increase of just 0.4% in the Homeland 
Security budget, the Division’s budget grew by 69% from the previous year. 
The build-up of offensive cyber capabilities is a more secretive and controversial development, 
but budget figures are available on the US Cyber Command unit, which reached full operational 
capacity in 2010. US Cyber Command falls under US Strategic Command, which is one of 
the 9 military command structures of the DOD. With its stated mission of carrying out the 
‘full spectrum military cyberspace operations [and to] ensure US/Allied freedom of action in 
cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries’ (US Stratcom, 2015), the establishment of 
Cyber Command can be seen as a move to militarise the cyber domain and develop offensive 
cyber warfare capabilities. Figure 3 shows the changing budget allocation for Cyber Command 
from 2010 to 2014 in constant US dollars.
FIGURE 3: CYBER COMMAND BUDGET, 2010-2014 (FUNG, 2014)
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Command budget, which has risen from $124 to $447 million since its inception. To give 
context to this spending pattern, the annual percentage growth in Cyber Command spending 
is compared in Figure 4 with that of the DOD; in other words, the entire military budget of the 
United States.  
FIGURE 4: ANNUAL GROWTH IN DOD AND CYBER COMMAND BUDGETS, 
2011-2014 (FUNG, 2014; SIPRI, 2015)
Despite decreases in each year to total defence spending, Cyber Command’s budget has tended 
to grow, and more than doubled in 2014 from the previous year. 
B. Iran Cyber Build-up
Like the US, Iran is also improving its cyber capabilities. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps has reportedly trained a cyber-army of 120,000 consisting of ‘university teachers, 
students, and clerics’, which it claims to be the second largest in the world (UNIDIR, 2013, 
p.32). In 2012 the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei established a new cyber unit called 
the ‘Supreme Council of Cyberspace’ (SCC), which has ultimate control over all Internet and 
cyber-related policies in Iran. The SCC’s 2014 budget was $40 million, which it receives from 
Iran’s larger ICT budget (Small Media, 2014, p.7). Since President Rouhani came to power, 
data has been released on Iran’s cyber security spending which is presented in figure 5.
9FIGURE 5: IRAN’S CYBER SECURITY BUDGET, 2013-2015 (SMALL MEDIA, 2015)
 
The cyber security budget has increased markedly from $3.4 million in 2013 to $19.8 million 
in 2015. To put this increase in context, Figure 6 compares the cyber security budget’s annual 
percentage growth in 2014 and 2015 with that of Iran’s ICT budget.
FIGURE 6: ANNUAL GROWTH IN IRAN’S ICT AND CYBER SECURITY BUDGETS,
2012-2015 (SMALL MEDIA, 2014; 2015)
Iran’s ICT budget has also been increasing year on year since 2013, but not on so great a scale 




The United States and Iran have a history of cyber conflict with one another, and as is shown 
in Table 1, Iran clearly has had more to fear from the United States between 2001 and 2011.
TABLE 1: CYBER CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN, 
2001-2011 (VALERIANO AND MANESS, 2014)
Initially Iran did not factor much in US cyber strategy, and the sole documented incident 
carried out by Iran was the 2009 Twitter hack which involved mere website defacement. The 
competitive cyber relationship was sparked in June 2010 with the discovery of the highly 
sophisticated Stuxnet computer virus that had been used to target one of Iran’s major nuclear 
enrichment plants in Natanz. The United States, in collaboration with Israel, is widely believed 
to have masterminded the attack as a means to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. According to 
Sanger (2012b, p.205), the attack destroyed 984, or a fifth, of the facility’s centrifuges. 
Iran’s immediate response to Stuxnet was muted, perhaps not wanting to show weakness, 
yet it soon began developing its cyber capabilities, and in March 2012 Ayatollah Khamenei 
announced the creation of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC). Operating under the 
SCC is the National Centre for Cyberspace (NCC) which is tasked with protecting the country 
from cyber-attacks, and to help develop a national Internet that would reduce Iran’s Internet 
dependency (Small Media, 2014, p.4). 
Retaliation for Stuxnet, and a physical display of Iran’s developing offensive cyber capabilities, 
came in the form of the ‘Shamoon’ attack, launched by Iran in August 2012 against the Saudi 
Aramco oil company. Valeriano and Maness (2015, p.157) judge the incident, which deleted 
data and removed the re-boot program from around 30,000 computers, to be an example of a 
‘weak state attempting to damage a rival and harm, by proxy, its large state sponsor and greatest 
consumer of oil’. 
After Stuxnet, it became clear that the US feared that Iran was learning from the attack, with the 
head of Air Force Space Command, General William Shelton, reporting to the media in January 
2013 that ‘it’s clear that the Natanz situation generated a reaction by them’. He identified Iran as 
‘a force to be reckoned with, with the potential capabilities that they will develop over the years 
and the potential threat that will represent to the United States’. He also called for increased 
cyber-security spending, and announced plans to increase the number of cyber personnel in his 
unit by 1,000 (Shalal-Esa, 2013).
That the US was developing a growing perception of threat from Iran is supported by a 








cyber-attacks launched against it, and had been behind several waves of DDoS attacks on US 
financial institutions, on top of the Saudi Aramco attack (Greenwald, 2015). 
US officials undoubtedly began to see Iran as a source of cyber threat around this time. Speaking 
before the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2012, the Director of National Intelligence, James 
Clapper, warned that ‘Iran’s intelligence operations against the United States, including cyber 
capabilities, have dramatically increased in recent years in depth and complexity’ (Shachtman, 
2012). Similarly, in the Committee on Homeland Security in April 2012, it was reported that 
Iran had invested over $1 billion in expanding its cyber capabilities, and had been carrying 
out cyber-attacks on media organisations to test its cyber strength (House of Representatives, 
2012). 
This is a clear example of a state perceiving a threat from the developing capabilities of another, 
as the action-reaction model predicts. Although a firm connection cannot be proven, it is 
unsurprising that the data presented on US cyber-warfare spending shows the largest increases 
after 2012, the year in which the United States apparently became more fearful of the threat 
from Iran as it responded to Stuxnet. The evidence suggests that both countries developed 
their capabilities in reaction to one another. Therefore, the competitive aspect of an arms race 
appears to be present here, as well as the rapid and mutual increase in cyber capabilities.
6. NORTH KOREA AND SOUTH KOREA
D. North Korean Cyber Build-up
The one-party Communist state of North Korea is strongly suspected to be building up its 
offensive cyber capabilities and is known to have a number of cyber warfare units. Acquiring 
reliable data on perhaps the most secretive country in the world is particularly challenging. 
Within the General Staff Department, the Reconnaissance General Bureau runs two main cyber 
organisations, Unit 91 and Unit 121, both understood to be the source of offensive operations. 
There are a total of six known cyber units, each with varying cyber warfare roles, including 
Unit 35 that is believed to be involved in training hackers (Hewlett Packard, 2014, p.26).
A defector to South Korea estimated that between 10 and 20% of North Korea’s military 
budget is spent on ‘online operations’ (Lee and Kwek, 2015), and a number of defectors as 
well as South Korean news organisations have made various claims over time regarding the 
size of North Korea’s army of cyber hackers. In figure 7, these estimates are pieced together to 
highlight the growth of North Korea’s offensive capabilities. 
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FIGURE 7: NORTH KOREA’S ‘CYBER ARMY’, 
2009-2015 (HEWLETT PACKARD, 2014; MULRINE, 2015; LEE AND KWEK, 2015)
 
If accurate, the data would suggest that the number of North Korean hackers has increased 
twelvefold since 2009. There is reason to believe such estimates due to the repeated nature of 
the information, yet the figures are potentially biased since defectors to the south are likely to 
support heightened concern for North Korean activities. 
E. South Korean Cyber Build-up
South Korea has also been developing its cyber capabilities and in 2010 a cyber-warfare unit 
was created, staffed by approximately 200 personnel (UNIDIR, 2013, p.41). The data used 
here to measure South Korea’s cyber build-up is the number of secure servers per million 
of the population. Secure servers are web servers that use encryption technology in Internet 
transactions, thus somewhat gauging a country’s cyber defences. It has certain weaknesses as 
an indicator of cyber power, but nevertheless appears to show a reaction from South Korea. The 
change in secure servers from 2003 to 2014 is plotted in Figure 8, and is compared with other 
groups of countries to put South Korea’s cyber build-up into context.
FIGURE 8: SOUTH KOREA’S SECURE SERVERS, 2003-2014 (WORLD BANK, NETCRAFT)
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Figure 6 shows a remarkable increase in the number of South Korea’s cyber defences. Secure 
servers grew from just 14 per million people in 2003, to 2,178 per million people in 2014. 
There was a particularly accelerated period of growth from 2010 when the number of secure 
servers more than doubled within a year. Furthermore, South Korea’s improvements to its cyber 
capabilities have evidently been on a much greater scale than that of its neighbours in the 
region, as well as among other economically advanced OECD member states.
F. Dyadic Interaction
There have been several known cases of cyber conflict between North and South Korea. Table 2 
shows a total of 11 incidents from 2001 to 2011, with North Korea initiating all but one of them.
TABLE 2: CYBER CONFLICT BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, 
2001-2011 (VALERIANO AND MANESS, 2014)
According to the data set, these 10 cyber incidents initiated by the North against the South all 
took place in the short space of three years between 2008 and 2011, thus giving South Korea 
a motive for increasing its cyber defences. The process of interaction here has typically been 
action by the North followed by reaction by the South. For example, in 2009 a DDoS attack 
hit the networks of several South Korean government organisations and banks (Weaver, 2009). 
In response, South Korea created a cyber command unit in 2010, with the defence ministry 
explicitly referencing the threat from North Korea as the justification for the development 
(Yonhap News Agency, 2010).
South Korea was again targeted by the North in 2011, in an attack that brought down 26 
government, military, and banking websites (BBC News, 2011). In the same year South Korea 
launched its cyber security strategy, now treating the cyber domain as part of the military sphere 
in the same way as land, sea, or air. Also included in the strategy was a requirement that the 
public and private sectors take measures to encrypt and back up data (Schweber, 2011). The 
huge increase in South Korean secure servers from 2010 to 2011 shown in Figure 6 is perhaps 
directly linked to this policy. In August 2012, the South called for the number of cyber security 
personnel in its cyber warfare unit to be increased to 1,000 from the 200 initially working there, 
to help cope with the North Korean threat (Korea JoonGang Daily, 2012).
Another incident in 2013 shut down the South Korean banking system and several television 
stations. This attack was somewhat more sophisticated in that malware was used, as opposed 
to the DDoS method, which simply overloads a system with requests (Sang-Hun 2013). 
This hinted at the growing offensive capabilities of North Korea. In reaction, South Korea 
announced another build up in manpower, revealing its intention to train an extra 5,000 cyber 
troops to defend against North Korean cyber-attacks (Hewlett Packard, 2014, p.4). If this was 








on North Korea’s cyber army as it shows South Korea trying to compete with the developments 
of its rival.
North Korea is by far the more aggressive state in the dyad, but the relationship has not been 
completely one sided, and the North blamed the South for an attack on its own websites only 
days before the 2013 attack on South Korea. North Korean State Television referred to the 
‘intensive and persistent virus attacks [that] are being made every day on Internet servers 
operated by the DPRK’ (Nam, 2013), and warned that they ‘will never remain a passive 
onlooker to the enemies’ cyberattacks’ (Sang-Hun, 2013).
The presence of a mutual cyber build-up, and the fact that both countries were targeting or 
responding to one another, is suggestive of an arms racing relationship between North and 
South Korea also.
7. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
Both cases appear to meet the criteria for a cyber-arms race which, when applied according 
to the standards of the international relations research community, is confirmed as a suitable 
framework for use in the cyber domain. The US-Iran case provides a novel example of cyber 
competition being driven by mutual insecurity, despite a vast difference in conventional power 
between them. The actual threat that Stuxnet posed sparked the cyber build-up by Iran, which 
in turn was perceived as a threat by the United States. The fact that these US security concerns 
began around the same time as the rapid increases to its cyber security spending suggests they 
were linked, and that a US-Iran cyber arms race was initiated around 2012. If uncertainty and 
defensive motivations are indeed at the heart of this cyber arms race, then, given the progress 
being made on the nuclear issue, there may be hope for an end to its escalation if confidence 
building measures can be put in place. 
The relationship between North and South Korea is somewhat different. Unlike the US-Iran 
dyad, the insecurity that characterises this arms race has been very one sided since North Korea 
is motivated in its build-up more by aggressive intent rather than fear. Although there is some 
indication that North Korea perceived a threat from South Korea, the North is mostly motivated 
by the desire to cause a nuisance to its long-term rival. This case is an example of an arms race 
where one state has mainly defensive motives whereas the other has offensive motives, and this 
creates a difficulty in finding a solution to the escalating competition. In a situation somewhat 
akin to that of a revisionist power, North Korea is unlikely to give up on its offensive ambitions 
regardless of levels of threat, which leaves South Korea little choice but to continue to build up 
its capabilities in response. 
This research has demonstrated that there is much the cyber security community can learn from 
international relations scholarship on arms races. It provides the basis for an understanding of 
the motivations behind the proliferation of cyber warfare capabilities currently observed in the 
international system by placing it within the context of interstate competition. Conceptualising 
this dynamic in cyberspace is an important step in working towards a more secure and 
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cooperative environment. Given the escalatory nature of arms races, our findings highlight 
the urgent need for policy makers to understand how their cyber security policies can lead to 
reactions and create instability as tensions spiral.
Our methodological limitations must be addressed, however. A likely criticism relates to 
whether we have been able to demonstrate that these cyber build-ups are explained purely by 
dyadic competition. For instance, surely US cyber spending is motivated just as much, and 
perhaps more, by its other competitors such as Russia or China. This could very well be true, 
and we have not tried to argue that its spending is wholly a function of Iranian threat. This is 
not a necessary criteria for arms races generally, as states must consider all potential threats 
in the system. Nevertheless, it is clear from our case study evidence that the US perceived a 
significant threat from Iran and vice versa, which correlates with notable developments in their 
cyber capabilities. 
Since cyber might be an asymmetric domain (Liff, 2012, p.409), we should not dismiss the idea 
that a traditionally weaker power like Iran plays an important role in US cyber strategy. An 
extensive report by security firm Cylance even places the Iranian threat on a par with Russia and 
China (Cylance, 2014). Our analysis leads us to suggest that the term arms race is a reasonable 
description of the relationship, based on our review of the case. We accept that we cannot 
demonstrate a causal link between patterns of cyber-build up and the actions or behaviour of 
another state. To establish such would be difficult without direct statements from the leadership, 
a condition rare in history. In any study of arms races, it is not possible to calculate just what 
proportion of spending is accounted for by one particular state, or what threat drives which 
weapons system. Moreover, factors internal to the state (political, economic, and technological) 
can have a major effect on military spending patterns, and how this idea relates to the cyber 
domain is a critical area for future research. 
This endeavour is only the beginning of a more systematic investigation of cyber build-ups in 
international politics. Our method of focusing on single state pairs represents a manageable first 
step in this particular area, and follows decades of research in the international relations field. 
At a minimum, we believe we have been able to show that external threats from other states, 
whether perceived or real, are an important variable in shaping a state’s national cyber security 
policies. We aim to build on what we have begun here and continue to identify the wider range 
of factors accounting for the acquisition of cyber capabilities. 
The next step will include expanding the number of cases, collecting data on a wider range 
of indicators, and developing a methodology for accurately judging cyber power. Despite the 
secrecy that pervades the domain, the collection and analysis of data relating to cyber security 
is possible, although difficult and time consuming. It is nevertheless a much needed task if we 
are to ground the study of cyber conflict within empirical research frameworks.
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